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There are no technical barriers to the
spread of electronic funds transfer. It
parallels all the work done by the check
system, and does it better, more cheaply,
faster, and at greater convenience to all
users of the payments system.1
George W. Mitchell, November 26, 1973
After years of being carefully planned,
tended and nurtured in the back rooms
of the nation’s financial community,
electronic banking finally seems ready to
blossom into reality.2
U.S. News and World Report, August 5, 1974
Get Ready for Cashless, Checkless
Living: For Many People It’s Already
Here, Lots of Advantages – But It’s
Scary, Too.3
Changing Times, October 1975
F or more than two decades, econo-
mists and business journalists have her-
alded the coming of a paperless society
in which electronic payments will
quickly replace the use of cash and paper
checks in retail transactions. However,
although tremendous advances in com-
puting and telecommunications have
facilitated development of inexpensive,
safe, electronic retail payments, neither
the number nor the dollar volume of
paper-based transactions has dropped
appreciably (see figure 1). Moreover,
only modest declines in the growth rate
of paper payments are predicted in the
near term.
There are several reasons why the adop-
tion of electronic payments instruments
has begun slowly. First, consumers seem
to have strong preferences for paper pay-
ments vehicles, partly because they are
familiar. Second, while paper-based
transactions may be more expensive on
average than electronic ones, the mar-
ginal cost to the consumer of making an
additional payment by check or cash is
typically very small. Third, doubts as to
the applicability of existing laws and
regulations increase the perceived risk of
using electronic instruments. Finally,
there are significant external benefits,
arising from network economies, asso-
ciated with these instruments.4  For in-
stance, the value to the consumer of any
payments vehicle depends on its accept-
ability (that is, on the number of estab-
lishments where it can be used). Like-
wise, an establishment’s willingness to
accept a method of payment ultimately
depends on projected consumer use.
While each of these impediments merits
investigation and discussion, this Eco-
nomic Commentary will focus on the
role of network externalities. For ease of
exposition, it will center on a single type
of electronic retail payments instrument
—the stored-value card.
n n   Network Externalities
Network externalities arise when the
benefit a consumer expects to receive
from a good or service depends on the
number of consumers using the good.
The fax machine is a classic example: 
If only one business owned a fax, the
machine would have no practical value.
The existence of a second machine
would increase the benefits to the first
machine’s owner by activating the
potential for sending and receiving
faxes. Each additional fax installation 
in a different location would increase
benefits to existing users; conversely, 
the benefits to the new purchaser would
depend on the number of machines
already installed.
This interdependency of demand means
that the market for a network good must
reach a minimum size before a sustain-
able equilibrium can be achieved. Econo-
mists Nicholas Economides and Charles
Himmelberg call this minimum size the
network’s “critical mass.”5  The concept
is important because market dynamics
can change considerably once critical
mass has been achieved. Markets for net-
work goods may grow slowly until
reaching a critical mass, then suddenly
begin expanding quite rapidly. This
makes it difficult to forecast the size of 
a market (or the economic importance 
of a good) on the basis of growth rates
before critical mass has been attained.
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Why aren’t more consumers replac-
ing cash and checks with electronic
innovations like stored-value cards?
This Economic Commentary focuses
on one of the reasons: A consumer’s
benefits from having a card depend
on how many businesses will take it in
payment. However, merchants will re-
fuse to invest in the systems needed to
accept the cards until they are sure
there will be enough consumer de-
mand to justify the expense. This in-
terdependency of demand will remain
an obstacle until the innovation
achieves critical mass, either in its
own time or with policymakers’ help.
ISSN 0428-1276Credit cards provide a useful illustration
of how growth dynamics in the market
for a network good can change over time,
with the good’s value to consumers de-
pending on the size of the network. For
example, figure 2 shows that the market
for Visa cards grew relatively slowly in
the early 1970s and exploded in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Had projections
of the number of Visa cards been based
on the market’s 1970–76 level and
growth rate, they would have seriously
understated the market’s 1996 size.
n n    Network Characteristics 
of Stored-Value Cards
Stored-value cards are a payments inno-
vation designed to substitute for cash
transactions. The cards carry transferable
cash-equivalent balances that can be
reloaded at specially fitted ATM ma-
chines and—in the future—at home
through devices attached to personal
computers. The balances they carry are
equivalent to cash because they can be
transferred in a retail transaction without
the direct involvement of a financial
intermediary.6  Credit card, debit card,
and check transactions, on the other
hand, represent instructions for the con-
sumer’s bank to pay the merchant (or the
merchant’s bank on the merchant’s
behalf). A depository institution’s direct
involvement in credit cards, debit cards,
and checks increases the fixed costs asso-
ciated with using these instruments, mak-
ing them impractical for small dollar
transactions. Because its balance is trans-
ferred directly from the consumer to the
merchant, the stored-value card could
replace a range of cash transactions.7
Stored-value cards are said to exhibit
network externalities because the aver-
age consumer’s benefit from using them
in transactions depends on how many
other consumers and businesses are
using the same vehicle. In addition, the
total benefits associated with the use of
stored-value cards exceed the benefits
accruing directly to an individual con-
sumer. By extending the network, one
person’s participation also increases the
benefits to others.
However, a Catch-22 dilemma arises
from the introduction of a new payments
instrument:8  Business and consumer
demand for stored-value cards are inter-
dependent. In our earlier example, the
benefits to a fax machine owner may
come from the ability to send messages
or to receive them. The network eco-
nomics do not change whether the ma-
chine’s value derives from one or both of
these functions. That is, the benefits this
person or business expects to derive
from ownership depend on the number
of machines installed, and the total bene-
fits of an additional machine exceed the
benefits accruing directly to its owner.
In the case of stored-value cards, there
are two types of benefits—those accru-
ing to the payor in a transaction and
those accruing to the payee. However, as
figure 3 shows, in the market structure
foreseen for most stored-value cards, the
payor and the payee are almost never the
same entity. Unlike the owner of a fax
machine, who can both send and receive
faxes (that is, switch sides of the market
or transaction), payors cannot receive
payments, nor can payees initiate them.
In other words, a participant is always on
only one side of the market. Hence, the
nature of the demand interdependency is
determined by the total number of mar-
ket participants and by the relative num-
bers of payors and payees.
Why does the demand for stored-value
cards depend on both the total and the
payor/payee balance? The explanation is
this: The benefit to the consumer (payor)
of having a stored-value card is a func-
tion of how many establishments will ac-
cept it in payment for goods and services.
Merchants (payees), on the other hand,
are likely to invest in the systems neces-
sary to accept stored-value cards only
when there is a sufficiently large demand
for using this payments instrument.
Therefore, the benefit a consumer ex-
pects to derive depends directly on the
number of establishments accepting
stored-value cards and only indirectly on
the number of consumers using them. A
merchant’s benefit, conversely, depends
directly on the number of consumers
using stored-value cards and only indi-
rectly on the number of establishments
accepting them. Herein lies the Catch-22
quality of the demand interdependency
for these cards.9
Critical mass in the stored-value-card
market will be reached when the demand
interdependency between payor and
payee is no longer economically signifi-
cant. This will occur when the benefits a
consumer or merchant expects to receive
from adopting this payments innovation
are not significantly affected by an in-
crease in the network’s size. Put more
simply, critical mass will be achieved
when the consumer’s expected benefit
from having a stored-value card will not
be materially affected by a small increase
in the number of consumers using it.
However, until critical mass is achieved,
the demand interdependency between
payor and payee increases uncertainty
about the viability and future value of
stored-value cards, causing consumers
and merchants to discount them and thus
reducing their perceived value. Because
there are fixed costs to payors and payees
associated with adopting a new instru-
ment, this increased uncertainty may
slow the stored-value card’s initial rate of
adoption and market growth, thereby
impeding its expansion toward a critical
mass. After all, a merchant’s decision to
accept the stored-value card depends on
whether the discounted expected future
returns from the card exceed the fixed
costs of installing the hardware and soft-
ware required to accept it.
FIGURE 1 PAYMENT TRENDS
SOURCES: American Bankers Association, Statistical Information on the Financial Services
Industry, 7th ed., Washington, D.C.: ABA, 1996; and Furash & Company estimates.n n    Policy Considerations
Network externalities are a form of mar-
ket failure that may result in underprovi-
sion of a good or service by the market
and the consequent reduction in the total
welfare of society. In the case of retail
payments innovations, policymakers and
elected representatives must determine
whether the market failure is economi-
cally significant and thus a problem
requiring government intervention.10
The case for government intervention 
in these markets has not yet been estab-
lished. Hence, current policy toward re-
tail payments innovations such as stored-
value cards seems to reject the need for
active government involvement in these
markets, at least for now.11  This stance
is partly a reflection of policymakers’
concern that government intervention
could distort the market for electronic
payments innovations. Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan ex-
pressed these sentiments in a speech on
electronic money: “If we wish to foster
financial innovation, we must be careful
not to impose rules that inhibit it. I am
especially concerned that we not attempt
to impede unduly our newest innovation,
electronic money, or more generally, our
increasingly broad electronic payments
system....To develop new forms of pay-
ment, the private sector will need the
flexibility to experiment, without broad
interference by the government.”12
Consequently, past government action
has been limited to technical changes in
the U.S. Code and interpretations of the
applicability of existing laws and regula-
tions to stored-value cards.13  Policy-
makers have focused their energies on
removing barriers to the cards’ growth,
while letting the market resolve the asso-
ciated technical and economic issues.14
Today’s benevolent wait-and-see policy
is thought to have a relatively low risk
because the market for electronic retail
payments innovations is fairly small
now and is projected to grow slowly. In
other words, policymakers feel they
have ample time to impose regulations
after the fact if market developments
warrant a reaction. This approach may
make sense in the early stages of market
development; however, it is important to
recognize that once the market attains a
critical mass, growth rates may acceler-
ate dramatically. The speed of this
change will narrow the window of
opportunity for curtailing negative mar-
ket developments, should they arise.
Hence, failure to understand the market
dynamics for goods exhibiting network
externalities increases the riskiness of a
wait-and-see policy.15  This makes it
important that policymakers address the
nature and severity of externalities in
formulating policy toward retail pay-
ments innovations.
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